“The Geographic Science of War: the Archduke Carl, Habsburg
Military Theory and Reaction to Revolution.”

This paper will explore the theoretical, and in places practical application, of the works of
the Archduke Carl as commander of Habsburg forces between 1794 and 1809. It will also
look at the broader, systematic writings that he engaged in after his permanent retirement
in 1815. These created a measured response that combined geographic and military
thinking in a way uniquely suited to the Habsburg political and social reality.

The Archduke Carl of Teschen, the victor of Stockach and Aspern, was the
premier commander of the Habsburg military between 1793 and 1809. When
actually given interest, he is often misunderstood for his inherent
conservatism as a leader, theorist and historian. Too often he is simply
eclipsed by the context of his overwhelming contemporaries: Napoleon
Bonaparte and Carl von Clausewitz. The reality is that Carl remained an
opponent of unlimited war; the type of which he believed had been created
by the French Revolution. To counter these new, so-called realities, he
wanted to “limit” the impact of war through a combination of rational
enlightenment principles, appeals to service, and the tenets of Theresian
Catholicism. In the end, Carl was to respond to the “emotional,”
nationalistic, forces of the Modern with Habsburg revanche. What follows is
a brief exploration of the Archduke’s political and military work and the
potential impact, both in theory and in practice.

Taking the field against the French for the first time in 1794, the Archduke
Carl held the rank of Feldzeugmeister, assumed command of the army’s
reserve corps in Belgium. The war against Revolutionary France would
begin its second year, and despite a great deal of effort, the campaign failed
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and the French permanently removed the Habsburgs from the Netherlands,
ending Carl’s several month career as the province’s governor. Claims of
poor health and the political intrigues of the Court would combine to keep
the archduke from a field command in 1795. Instead, he dedicated the year
to the study of what he labelled the “military sciences.” During this year of
semi-retirement Carl completed his first military treatise, titled: On the War
Against the New Franks.1 Measuring the limited successes and glaring
failures that the Austrians had experienced up to 1794, he puzzled over how
the poorly disciplined and equipped French could defeat professional
Austrian troops and commanders. Part of his answer was that the generals
had lazily restricted themselves to a defensive war based on lines-ofcommunication. But that was not the key, for Carl felt that: “...ignorance,
indolence,

and

egotism

are

to

blame

for

our

misfortunes.”2

Before moving forward, it is essential to understand Carl’s strategic and
tactical antecedents. One, in particular, stands out, and was likely first given
Carl by his tutor which were the works of Justus Lipsius, the great Dutch
Neo-stoic author.3 The Neostoics believed that the state must stand against
all the extremes of nationalism and unjust expansion, preferring to take a
“cosmopolitan” position. For the Neostoic nothing took place by chance, but
rather everything followed Providence in a set scheme, the individual
remaining consistent in his service to the state. In sum, Lipsius called for an:
“exceedingly severe, controlled manliness in the Stoic mold, in short for a
character anchored in reason.”4 A commander, entrusted with the
responsibility of preserving the army, was only to enter battle after great
consideration, and then only rarely. The physical representation of self2

control was in Lipsius’ insistence that when a general chose battle, he must
hold back a strong reserve.5 For the archduke the notion of the Neo-stoic
restraint seem to have always rung true.

Lipsius, also an important source for the earlier Dutch military reformer
Maurice of Nassau, emphasized discipline as the foundation of a
professional army.6 He classified wars as being either just or unjust, the
determining factor resting on whether the instigator had a just cause and a
just objective. Justification was secured through opposition to tyrants or the
re-conquest of unlawfully taken territories. Because the ruler decided for or
against war, it was something he had to weigh carefully, first driving the
“war-mongers” from his court. Finally, Lipsius stated clearly that the lone
objective of war is peace.7 In dealing with the human element of an army,
Lipsius upheld discipline as the tonic for the restoration of order and morale.
The general achieved this goal through the use of frequent drill, strict
regulations, and obedience generated by rewards and punishments. Applied
correctly, Lipsius felt this would lead to a “moral regeneration” of the
soldiery and a new mentality of service.8 This was not, therefore, a
“motivation” or “emotional” pitch, but something more scientific – it was to
grab men in the fraternal link of “knowing how” rather than being “inspired
to.”

Carl’s dogmatic Catholicism becomes most evident in his repugnance to
war’s violence, especially the new, revolutionary notion of unlimited
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warfare. On a number of occasions he makes it clear that he neither seeks
war nor its glories. The primary example comes at the beginning of the
Fundamentals of the Higher Art of War where the archduke clearly states
that the: “greatest evil that can befall a nation is war,” and it was a crisis that
called for the general to act quickly in order to achieve a favorable peace.9
Carl supports this assertion with a quote from Tacitus: “only rarely is a bad
peace made better through war.”10 This does not mean that war itself was
illegal, or that it could always be avoided, but rather that warfare required
limitations that came from a delineating set of principles.
Carl’s first serious work on operations, The Fundamentals of the Higher Art
of War encompassed the eighteenth century notion of “limited warfare” and
the unwillingness to evoke the full physical energies of one state against
another. A general did not look to the unrealistic annihilation of an
opponent, but to force him into “offering terms.”11 The commander was to
obtain success through the application of “decisive blows” (entscheidende
Schläge) against a specified “decisive point” (Punkt). Carl felt this could be
best achieved by uniting all available forces, his stated fundamental
operational principle in the art of war. This massing of force applied in all
circumstances and required scrupulous oversight. On a less strategic note the
archduke designated the specific types of troops best suited for varying
terrain. He preferred that an army consist primarily of regular infantry, as it
was the most flexible among the varieties of geography. Cavalry had the
mission of covering the flanks and delivering the “decisive blow” at the end
of a battle, while the artillery’s function was to act in a supporting role.12
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Carl established that there were two forms of war: the defensive and the
offensive. The difference was simple. A general that had a superiority of
troop strength and a distinct geographical advantage took the offensive. He
took the defensive only when placed at a distinct disadvantage. Switching to
the offensive later, which was the goal of an active defense, became
increasingly difficult as it required a change in the states’ “political will”
(politischen Verhältnissen).13 The basis of a campaign was the operation’s
plan, which determined the “line” of advance and communications, referred
to as the “operation’s line” (Operationslinie). Whether on the defensive or
the offensive, the security of this line remained paramount, as it insured the
flow of supplies and allowed for a secure withdrawal. If the enemy
threatened or cut the operation’s line, the army would be forced into a
disadvantageous retreat without battle.14 The goal of the offensive was to
thwart the enemy’s plans while gaining a clear superiority through the
occupation of “key places.” These key places were geographic points of
significance, such as fortresses or road junctions. The advance was to be
cautious, with the operation’s line kept short. Because the defender had the
advantage of fighting on home terrain, an advancing force required flanking
detachments to guard against any “trickery” on the part of the enemy. 15

Carl believed that the fortress presented the best strategic point for the
creation of an operation’s base, the “key place,” whether on the defensive or
offensive. Because these structures had such potential, they dominated the
placement of base lines. The fortress’s great tenability enhanced the defense
of the line-of-operations, and in defeat it secured that line. On the defense
fortresses covered the main approaches into the state while on the offensive
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they acted as a base of operations. If an enemy fortress sat astride the line of
advance, or operation’s line, the army halted and initiated a formal
investment. Because of its utility, states placed fortresses at strategic points,
such as the juncture of major road or river networks. The location, size and
number of fortresses also determined the offensive capacity of an area, as
they provided a pre-made base line. The incorporation of a fortress in the
line-of-communications was significant as it provided greater security in
retreat and gave the army a point to rally.16 “Without these cautions,” the
archduke stated, “the continuation of the advance and the fortunes of war
(Waffenglücks) would weaken and then dissolve.”17 The emphasis that Carl
placed on the use of the fortress was representative of his primarily
defensive-oriented mentality.18

Supply was, for Carl, a critical operational concern that faced a commander
in war, and second only to the “key” points. A general’s first responsibility
at the outbreak of hostilities, even before the creation of a strategic plan, was
the preparation and placement of supply depots. The general designated a
primary line-of-operations (Hauptoperationslinie) that lead back from the
army over a good road network to a series of fortresses or protected points.
These pre-designated and protected points were the base from which the
army operated.19 Carl believed that the careful accumulation and
transportation of stores permitted greater operational flexibility and strategic
security.20 The field commander’s primary concern was the movement of
supplies and the protection of his magazines. As a rule he coordinated his
movements to provide for the protection of supply columns and depots. Carl
felt that the operation’s base should sit parallel to the enemy’s position,
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which allowed for the fewest possible threats. The army could then advance
on a line perpendicular to the opponent’s base line. By placing the army
between the base and the enemy the general secured his line-of-operations.
The archduke generally discouraged broad flanking maneuvers for the
simple reason that they exposed one’s own line-of-communications.21

When the operation’s line changed, then the influence of the surrounding
region on the army did so as well. This resulted in necessary adjustments to
the base line and the line-of-communications. The commander determined if
the points once forming the original operation’s base remained essential for
the rest of the war’s conduct, or whether they had only exerted an influence
over that operation. Carl labeled the first type of point a “key to the region”
insisting the army’s permanently sustain a line to it. These points were also
crucial in the case of retreat because the army would fall back upon them. 22

In conjunction with these depots the archduke dealt with foraging, which he
labeled as the act of acquiring the necessary supplies for men and horses. He
drew a difference, however, between supplies taken by foraging and that
drawn from the actual magazine, because troops acquired forage locally.23
Before sending out detachments to forage the exact needs of the army were
determined and the region given a thorough reconnaissance. Carl estimated
that most theatres of operation would have half of all available land under
cultivation and two-thirds of that would have crops. The archduke placed the
responsibility for the gathering of forage at the regimental level, with
foraging parties to be led by staff officers with strict orders to prohibit
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pillaging by potentially licentious troops.24 While local acquisition was
always possible, it was best that an army should carry what it could with it,
acquiring the rest as it moved forward. Further, Carl emphasized that it was
essential to pay with bills or cash for supplies acquired locally, because by
using free purchase and quick payment magazines would always be full.
This system kept the local inhabitants at peace and avoided exhausting the
area in which the army operated. The archduke felt this policy limited the
potential for partisans to rise up in the army’s rear areas. Carl would write
mournfully in his history of the War in Spain of the example of the French,
and the disaster that their endemic pillaging brought. Conversely he held up
Wellington’s very successful example of local purchase of supplies with
cash as the ideal.25

An example of the fear of provoking the destructive forces of nationalism
came in the Second Reform Period (1805-09) were Carl, again president of
the Monarchy’s War Department, concentrated primarily on the sphere of
tactical and strategic restructuring.26 Despite the changes that the Revolution
had apparently brought about in military practice, Carl remained
conservative in outlook. At no time did he wish to create or copy the radical
changes carried out by the French. To build a national army similar to the
one France fielded after 1792 would have required a paradigmatic shift in
the political and social structure of the Monarchy. 27 Carl’s notion of military
change remained confined within the limits of in his rational, supra-national
dynastic orientation. The archduke’s idea was not to replace the old way, but
instead to create an improved system, borrowing from the new where
possible or unavoidable.28 Unwilling to tap into the potential Pandora’s Box
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of nationalism, Carl preferred to raise morale and motivation among the
troops by building upon a combination of “character and education.”29

A single, tactical example of the archduke’s rejection of many of the newer
French innovations can be seen in how Carl viewed the rise of open-order
fighting, or skirmishing. For him it represented an anomaly of the Wars of
the French Revolution. He saw the genesis of these new methods as a
combination of necessity and the French “national character.”30 This change
resulted from the fact that the French Army had been composed quickly and
without the adequate training considered standard at the time, and therefore
forced the French to fight in “open order.” Out of this necessity they created
a new system, and because of its apparent successes, Carl responded to it.31

Carl found this tactical dispersal of strength a violation of the principle of
unity, undermining the chance for a decisive victory. Allowing for the use of
a large percentage of men to skirmish (herumschwärmend) created the
danger of being caught dispersed by an attacking enemy. 32 Because of this
the archduke did not believe that open fighting could be decisive on the
battlefield, but he conceded that when facing an opponent using this tactic,
one had to counter it with the deployment of skirmishers. The number of
men committed would remain small, however, just enough to contain the
enemy.33 Carl saw the dispersal of troops, however few, as a risk because an
enemy attack in column would not allow for their return, and might prove
overwhelming. The men fighting in open order were useful chiefly in tiring
and demoralizing the enemy, but the real decision in the battle would come
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in the end from an army’s overall strength, types of troops, and use of
terrain.34

The difference between open order and the tightly controlled line-of-battle
possessed some psychological importance as well. Carl felt the key element
in keeping a soldier from becoming crazed or shaken with fear was the
imposition of constant and blind obedience (Gehorsam). This meant that
troops in a sound formation could not be “broken” by the skirmishers,
because each soldier gained strength from his comrades. On the other hand
the lone soldier was prone to the “emotional” effects of battle, isolated and
susceptible to counter-attack. So while the new French system had
succeeded in several battles, Carl remained convinced that the ability to
replace their losses was the real reason for their victories.35

Carl felt that the Wars of the French Revolution had produced a time when
the decisiveness of the strategic advantage was greater than ever before.
There was the movement of massed troops in a fashion previously thought
impossible, and the ability to replace losses made tactics even more
subservient to strategy. Campaigns of a few weeks could produce results that
would previously have taken years. Also, that while some traditionally
important strategic points had lost their value, others had become more
important.36
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Despite this the archduke still believed the principles of strategy retained
their original spirit (Geist), allowing for the design of a specific system for
each state. He wanted these principles to provide instruction, but he added
that they were not dogmatic, because that would be both wrong and
restrictive. Future leaders entrusted with armies needed to have the freedom
to act once instructed in the rules of strategy. He emphasized not only the
development of a system of fortresses and an effective field army, but also
the maintenance of interior lines-of-communication like bridges, roads,
canals, depots, and magazines. The close management of these arteries must
either be a maxim for an empire, or a matter of decline. The reason, Carl
insisted, for France’s success during the Revolutionary wars came from its
concentration on the “principles of the defensive system” with which it had
subjugated all of Europe.37 No doubt that the Archduke would have seen
vindication of this in the failure of the Monarchy to build and maintain
adequate fortress depots and especially rail lines. The result of this stinginess
and lack of foresight would result in Austria’s inability to strategically
maneuver in both 1866 and 1914.

The outcome of all of Carl’s work is hard to accurately measure. It is clear
that even without the writings of the archduke, the Monarchy would have
gone into the period between 1815 and 1847 with a conservative, if not
reactionary mind-set. Who read the archduke and to what degree his ideas
were absorbed cannot be given a number. That said, the Austrian military
establishment did put its efforts, albeit always limited by financial stinginess
of the first degree, into a regular army and traditional fortresses. The army
remained multi-national, but not multi-cultural, rather it was something a
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“School of the Empire” (versus the “school of the nation” concept). Its fear
of nationalism prompted the policy whereby regiments during this time were
often located out of the national area recruited and regularly switched billets.
As for the fortress, since the Monarchy saw Italy as the key to the future
after 1815, it placed its limited spending in the four forts of the
“Quadrilateral,” Verona, Legnano, Mantua and Pesciera.38 While several
more fortresses existed prior to 1847, they all suffered heavily from any real
funding or maintenance.

In the end Carl’s vision of the future of the Monarchy, as well as war itself,
was only a slightly altered version of the past. Rather then marked changes,
the Archduke looked to reform the military establishment through the
application of honest, humane and realistic measures. It appears that Carl did
believe that a durable and fairly run institution, based on rational principles,
would outlast the mercurial nature of the revolutionary forces unleashed
after 1789.

Lee W. Eysturlid
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